= Issues =
 * Design issue: In my design, the Certificate struct has an ptr to a GnuTLS certificate structure to hold its internal data. This has the consequence that the SSL connection system and X.509 handling must both be provided by GnuTLS; if, say, SILC provides the X.509 handling, and GnuTLS the SSL connections, everything grinds to a gruesome segfaulty halt.

 Should I address this? The only workaround I can think of is to keep a pointer to the PEM-formatted certificate in the Certificate struct instead, but that will require any consumers of the Certificate to have PEM encoding/decoding and constantly decode it from PEM for every use. (June 19)

 * How to ensure that VerificationRequests get properly trashed in unusual conditions (such as canceling an SSL connection)? (June 26)

 * Jabber.org presents a cert with a CN of "*.jabber.org". How to check this? (26 June)
  * Update: This is *almost* valid. "foo.jabber.org" is valid with this certificate, but not "jabber.org" itself! (8 July)

 * #1947
= Resolved Issues =
 * It looks like PKCS12 (the certificate import/export format) is supported by both libNSS and GnuTLS.
 * Jabber "connect with fd" problem solved by porting a change from soc.2007.xmpp (29 May, June 26)
 * '''Why doesn't a "not accepted" on a certificate cause the connection to fail?''' I suspect this is caused by auto-reconnect, so it might be necessary to disable the account involved! (26 June)
  * This could be related to Jabber not handling the BAD_CERTIFICATE error code?
  * I think this is resolved...at least, I can't reproduce it any more.. (11 July)

= TODO =
 * General paranoia
 * Look at how the SILC prpl does its key management, especially the organization of the API used to check certs and interact with the user to verify them.
 * Add some way of passing useful error messages back up out of the SSL interface (23 May)
 * Fix purple_ssl_init in sslconn.c; it doesn't do anything (23 May)
  * Talking to nosnilmot suggests that this ought to just be removed outright (24 May)
 * Figure out libNSS everything. (25 May)
  * http://lxr.mozilla.org/mozilla/ident?i=CERT_GetCertTimes
 * Why am I getting single-byte serial numbers from servers? (25 May)
 * Stall the timeouts on the TCP connection while waiting for user input on SSL? (29 May)
 * Worry about ensuring that plugins don't kill in-use ciphers/certschemes when unloaded? (29 May)
 * Adium uses neither GnuTLS nor NSS. Look into extending the OpenSSL plugin (26 June)
 * Guarantee that purple_certificate_verify will '''not''' fire its callback until the next return to mainloop. sadrul says to do this with g_timeout_add (June 28)
 * Change the things that purple_certificate_verify does such that it is easy for one verification request to make another. This will involve making a "copy" operator for certificates. (7 July)
 * Disapprove 42fb4d80947518f87ddcaf43bf2675d8496698de (7 July)
 * Reference-count Certificate instances instead of making full copies? (8 July)
  * Implemented in f9e47ecff65cbcb1e87b8fedd271ec5b02123fcf, but may need testing (13 July)
 * '''Refactoring.''' The certificate interface feels too complicated. (11 July)
 * activation/expiration should be made one function in the Scheme, as that's how NSS does it. (13 July)
 * HIG compliance (17 July)
 * How should a PidginCertificateManager signal that it *cannot* be displayed? (19 July)
 * Degrade gracefully when the CertMgr subsystem lacks important bits. (3 Aug)

= Tasks done =
 * Figure out how to get key fingerprints out of GnuTLS (25 May, 25 May))
 * GnuTLS and NSS should probably be configured to use g_malloc and g_free for paranoia's sake (1 June, 26 June)
 * e408398aae606a1aafb857413db4fa9736e374ae should be disapproved. It is hacky and stupid (26 June, 7 July)
 * Why won't gtkcertmgr.h get properly processed by "make docs"? (13 July, 13 July)
  * sadrul is awesome. Typos are not.
 * Work out how to use Glib functions for time checking on certificates. (29 May, 13 July)
  * POSIX for the win.