Changes between Version 9 and Version 10 of EndToEndXMPPCrypto


Ignore:
Timestamp:
01/17/15 09:19:10 (4 years ago)
Author:
elb
Comment:

--

Legend:

Unmodified
Added
Removed
Modified
  • EndToEndXMPPCrypto

    v9 v10  
    2828 * '''Streamlined one-on-one Chat.'''  An equivalent protocol to the XMPP simple <message> stanza with a cleartext <body>, only encrypted and authenticated.  The point of this protocol is to minimize overhead for typical one-on-one chat, for the benefit of mobile and bandwidth- or computationally-constrained clients.
    2929 * '''Arbitrary protected stanzas.'''  A method should be provided for protecting arbitrary end-to-end XMPP stanzas, either with only authentication or with both authentication and encryption.  An example mechanism supporting this point would be an e2e encrypted data stanza simply containing a standard XMPP stanza that has been encrypted and authenticated that is unwrapped at the receiving client and then processed as if it had been in place of the encrypted stanza.  Existing standards and best practices for encrypting partial XML documents should be consulted.
     30 * '''Protected client-to-client communication.'''  This must include file transfer, and ideally it would also include things like voice and video streams.  Clients must provide notification to the user if a cleartext client-to-client channel is attempted during an otherwise secured session or when no session is currently present.
    3031 * '''A plurality of key authentication mechanisms.'''  The public key exchange mechanism should allow for multiple disparate authentication methods to be communicated.  For example, an S/MIME signature using a PKI x.509 certificate and a GPG signature of the same key material might be provided, along side whatever native signing protocol is used.  These authentication mechanisms should be readily extensible and have enough structure that useful mechanisms can be clearly defined.  Note that the client itself need not handle mechanisms it does not understand, but mechanisms should be designed such that the client can present the information to the user in a form that lends itself to validation -- ''e.g.'', a GPG signature might simply be presented as an ASCII armored text block.
    3132 * '''Opportunistic encryption.'''  Indication of encryption and authentication capabilities should be provided in some way to clients who are not on our roster or who do not have us in their roster, so that encryption may be used opportunistically.  This should include a way to exchange keys and key authentication materials.  Some sort of access control may be required to prevent automated exchanges from becoming a DoS or privacy attack vector.
All information, including names and email addresses, entered onto this website or sent to mailing lists affiliated with this website will be public. Do not post confidential information, especially passwords!